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1. Introduction
Whilst Best (1997:p. 223) suggests that only ethical people
can make ethical choices , many cynical observers of adver-
tising in society would argue that advertisers are increasingly
unethical in their attempts to reach their target markets. The
activity has been described as pervasive (Drake, 1988), intru-
sive (Blakeney and Barnes, 1982) and, at times, pernicious. In
the same vein, Mittal (1994) has suggested that the purveyors
of the art have been known to be mischievous in their
commercial role. Globally, we are told, developed and devel-
oping societies are bombarded by several hundred millions
of different advertisements which are published and broad-
cast each year (Boddewyn, 1992). On the one hand, these
figures are testament to the importance of this, the most visi-
ble, element of the marketing mix (Boddewyn, 1989:22),
however they can also be viewed as further evidence that
some members of society may need to be protected as some
advertising can be harmful.
A small proportion of advertisements are offensive, false,
misleading, unfair, or socially irresponsible, or they are
perceived as such by the general public. So, when this is the
case, a structure needs to be in place in order to provide
protection to all parties. To complement their legal systems,
developed countries have established programs of regulation
which, in the main, are operated on a self-regulatory basis,
where the industry is responsible for controlling the conduct
of its own members. However, the recent breakdown in
Australia of one of the world s longest established advertising
self-regulatory systems, and the introduction of a new system,
highlights the problems associated with providing effective
protection for society from unacceptable advertising (Media
Council of Australia, 1996; Strickland, 1996).
The achievement of acceptable advertising through self-regu-
latory systems is a topic that has been debated spasmodically
in leading marketing journals for over twenty years. The
extant literature can be classified into two key streams, the
first provides a significant, although somewhat descriptive,
body of knowledge of advertising self-regulation (ASR) in
general and examines, for example, how various schemes
function around the world (Neelankavil and Stridsberg, 1980;
Miracle and Nevett, 1987; Boddewyn, 1988, 1992). The
second stream is more prescriptive and provides normative
guides for regulators and advertisers to assist in developing
effective ASR programs. Indeed, research studies have
provided seven tests (Moyer and Banks, 1977), five activities
(LaBarbera, 1980), five recommendations (Armstrong and
Ozanne, 1983), six tasks (Boddewyn, 1985), and fifteen rules
(Wiggs, 1992) as normative guides for advertisers in develop-
ing ASR programs. 
Despite these research themes, little is known about how
acceptable advertising can be defined and monitored. Thus, in
the overall context of advertising regulation, this article has two
objectives: first, to present and discuss the key variables asso-
ciated with acceptable advertising. Second, to use these vari-
ables as a framework to analyse the way advertising is regulat-
ed in Australia — comparing the new administration to the old.
2. Regulation, Self-Regulation and Advertising
The parent body of literature for this research is social control
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) and, in particular, regulatory
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theory, incorporating collective action and group decision-
making, in the context of advertising.
Regulation is used by government to support, or to obtain the
collaboration or assistance of business, as well as to control it
(Byrt, 1990). Indeed, there are few business activities in
Australia that are not subject to government regulation, either
directly or indirectly (Pincus and Withers, 1983). However,
regulation can have a very broad meaning in everyday life
and this is largely a result of its historical usage (Harris and
Carman, 1984). Indeed, in their typology of regulatory
response, Harris and Carman emphasise the fact that regula-
tion is generic and very broad in scope and effect (1984, 43).
Regulation is primarily concerned with social control and, in
the context of this article, specifically the interaction between
authority and exchange (Harris and Carman, 1983). The
authority of the state is used to protect those involved in the
exchange process. The concept of exchange is at the heart of
the marketing process and, when dealing with advertising in a
society, those people who are often exposed to increasing
amounts of advertising are often those least able to protect
themselves when that advertising oversteps the boundaries of
acceptability. The item exchanged in advertising is informa-
tion, and problems arise when misleading, deceptive or offen-
sive information is communicated to the marketplace, in other
words unacceptable advertising.
One of the most important, and current, challenges for both
marketing and public policy researchers and practitioners is to
ensure that the remedy chosen to avert, or correct, market fail-
ure is the best that can be designed (Carman and Harris,
1986). Thus, effective ASR frameworks are one such remedy
for unacceptable advertising practices.
Whilst research in this area is problematic, scholars such as
Wotruba (1997) have issued the challenge to researchers,
suggesting that the literature on self-regulation in general has
little empirical flavour, does not inform about the effective-
ness of schemes, does not enlighten about what types of
programs are more effective than others, under what condi-
tions and for what interested stakeholders. Given this chal-
lenge, it is not surprising that there are cynics among
researchers when discussing the merits or demerits of indus-
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Table 1:
Unacceptable Advertisements
Breach Guilty Party/Case Reasoning Country Year
Deceptive Federal Trade The advertising of a stop smoking spray that United States of America 1995
Commission v. does not work effectively,
Ruta Lee
False Driscoll v. Advertising the speed at which their modems United States of America 1997
US Robotics could download information faster from the Internet
Unfair Federal Trade Regarding the use of Joe Camel  in advertisements United States of America 1998
Commission v. as being unfair advertising as it is targeting minors
RJR Tobacco Co.
Offensive Smiths Foods Advertisement depicting camera-clicking Asians Australia 1999
Socially People s A billboard advertisement promoting an adults-only Australia 2000
Irresponsible Truth/Heartbalm Website failed to treat sex, sexuality and nudity with
sensitivity to its relevant audience, particularly
given its prominent outdoor location, which effectively
placed it on general exhibition to the general public
Misleading Papa John s Pizza A federal district court in Dallas ruled Papa John s United States of America 2000
Better ingredients. Better pizza  slogan is deceptive
and misleading advertising 
Source: FTC File Number 942 3058; Burstiner, 1997; Meillo, 1998; Advertising Standards Board Complaint Reference Number 69/98;
Advertising Standards Bureau, 1999; Siebert, 2000).
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try self-regulation; indeed, some researchers have warned that
self-regulation is like letting the lunatics run the asylum
(Ducret, 1991).
Before the advent of self-regulation of any industry, a strong
driving force must be apparent. A knee-jerk reaction from
many industries when faced with the prospect of government
regulation is to opt for self-regulation in an attempt to stave
off what is seen as interference in the marketplace by
government bodies.
In the advertising industry this is often the impetus needed to
establish the foundations for self-regulation of an industry
and, whilst the reasons might be purely enlightened self-inter-
est, the positive outcome, when compared to a legal alterna-
tive, is a fast, cost-effective system, supported by the industry.
However, where advertising industries opt for self-regulation
of their members conduct and behaviour, they pay the price
of constant scrutiny by interested parties such as government
bodies, consumer groups and social commentators. Many
ASR schemes around the globe, including Australia, have
evolved in this way.
Whilst ASR is an attractive option for advertisers, a pre-requi-
site to continued operation and, little direct government
involvement, is the concept of collective action . Collective
action has three main purposes (Harris and Carman, 1984:46);
first to realise economies of scale in production, second to
internalise the benefits of productive actions and, finally, to
change the balance of power between participants in the
exchange process. However, when focusing on the marketing
exchange process, and in particular the activity of advertising,
unless the vast majority of advertisers are committed to, and
involved in, the ASR scheme, continued self-regulation will
be short-lived.
Gupta and Lad (1983) suggested that industry self-regulation
will only take place if the firms in the industry, the advertis-
ers, decide to cooperate with each other. Similarly, where the
ASR scheme incorporates a national tripartite system
(Boddewyn, 1992; Sinclair 1992) and the advertisers, agen-
cies and media are involved in the process, cooperation will
be significantly enhanced. This collective action, which
grows out of the need to regulate, succeeds in spreading the
decision-making responsibility across a group. Although
group decision-making has received a number of criticisms
over the years (wasting of time, evading individual responsi-
bility, producing conformity and compromise [Ofner, 1959]),
the benefits of quality and acceptance of group decisions still
prevail (Jewell and Reitz, 1981). 
3. Acceptable Advertising - The Key Variables
The literature in the area suggests a conceptual framework of
Advertising Self-Regulation
Figure 1: Acceptable advertising; a framework for analysis
Source: Harker, 1998
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acceptable advertising, which can be applied to analyse the
regulation of advertising in developed countries. The frame-
work is shown at figure 1.
3.1 Acceptable Advertising
There is a relationship between the relative economic impor-
tance of annual advertising expenditure in an economy and the
existence or absence of a self-regulatory body concerned with
unacceptable advertising (Neelankavil and Stridsberg, 1980).
In other words, the more money spent on the activity in a
country, the greater the need for protection from unacceptable
advertising. However whilst advertising contributes to a coun-
try s economy it must also satisfy the social norms that exist
in that country, that is, the activity should be responsible and
accountable, providing acceptable advertising to society.
Irrespective of whether they work within a legal or self-regu-
latory system, advertising regulators must still attempt to
define acceptability . Defining any value-laden term such as
acceptability is problematic, and this difficulty is exacerbat-
ed by the competing interests that enter into debates on adver-
tising. That is, advertisers typically hold the view that, in a
free society, they should be permitted to promote their prod-
ucts and services as they wish, provided they do not breach
the privileges of free speech (i.e. their messages are not
misleading, deceptive or defamatory). Advertising agencies
concur with this view, since it allows them to exercise their
creative craft freely. Consumers and certain interest groups
(such as religious groups, churches, lobby groups) within the
public domain believe such freedom needs boundaries. At the
heart of any good advertising message is the concept of
communication and, whilst the communication process has
been studied at length in the marketing literature, the true
purpose of any communication must not be overlooked; that
is, to transfer meaning from source to receiver. The difficul-
ty that advertisers face, however, is that meaning is subjec-
tive; it is internal to the receiver, rather than external (Shimp,
2000) and this has serious implications for those concerned
with controlling unacceptable advertising.
Regulators attempt to deal with this issue by considering
prevailing community standards , by ensuring complaints
boards contain representatives from throughout the communi-
ty, and by publicising their adjudications widely. These meas-
ures (discussed in more detail later) mean acceptability is
defined by default as advertising that did not clearly fall foul
of legal or self-regulatory standards. This approach is prag-
matic, since regulators must take decisions, but it needs also
to be recognised that these decisions are subjective. Table I
provides some examples of recent unacceptable advertising
from around the world. The examples include the reason for
the breach of the code, typical recalcitrant advertisers and the
precedential decision.
3.2 Prevailing Community Standards 
Attempts to represent prevailing community standards in an
ASR system are usually achieved by involving the public in
the complaint handling process, which should lead to
increased effectiveness of the program (LaBarbera, 1980;
Boddewyn, 1983; Armstrong and Ozanne, 1983; Moyer and
Banks, 1977; Trade Practices Commission, 1988) and also
provide a credible and transparent process which is open,
frank and candid for all. Some programs also attempt to moni-
tor trends in advertising and community standards as a means
of better representing current standards in the community
(Canadian Advertising Foundation, 1991).
Involvement from the public can be at two levels; as
complainants and also as members of the complaint handling
body. Most complaints in most countries originate from
members of the public and, as ASR programs are established
primarily to protect these people, this situation is healthy.
However, there is concern about the growing number of
complaints stemming from competitors and trade organisa-
tions in countries such as Canada (Boddewyn, 1992) and
Australia (Harker, 1996).
There is no magic mix regarding the make-up of a complaint
handling body and there is little in the literature to guide us as
to what ratio works best. America, for example, does not have
any outside participation on their National Advertising
Division Committee, being entirely staffed by attorney
advertising review specialists (Internet BBB Web Server,
1995) whilst, at the other end of the spectrum, the United
Kingdom operates with two-thirds of its twelve-person board
being completely independent (Boddewyn, 1992).
Whatever the mix, the public persons who are involved in
determining complaints are generally not ordinary people
but rather of the great and the good (Boddewyn, 1983:p. 83)
and amateur, but often distinguished (Tunstall, 1983:p. 237).
In essence the public members of a complaint handling body
are better educated and better known people and, usually,
members of the Establishment . However, one might ques-
tion the appropriateness of such people to represent the
prevailing community standards of a society.
3.3 The Legal Regulatory Framework
The fundamental determinant of a developed or developing
country s ASR system is a sound legal regulatory framework
which complements the self-regulatory structure (Miracle and
Nevett, 1987:xxii). The legal regulatory framework in this
instance refers to the laws and regulations in place to protect
society from unacceptable advertising, and also to those
bodies charged with implementing the laws and regulations.
The laws and regulations governing advertising practices
obviously vary from country to country; however, there are
certain areas of commonality that assist in improving the
acceptability of advertising at the country level. While much
legislation that deals with advertising relates to aspects of
consumer protection or regulation of competition (Sverdrup
and Sto, 1992), in most developed countries illegal advertis-
Advertising Self-Regulation
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ing practices, encompassing unacceptable advertising , are
governed by laws pertaining to marketing or broadcasting
and many countries have umbrella legislation of this kind in
place1. Further, there has been a recent world-wide trend to
outlaw tobacco advertising in many countries2. Regulatory
agencies or bodies which complement this legislation are
apparent in Australia and these have not changed for many
years3.
3.4 The Advertising Self-Regulatory Framework
There is an important overlap between a country s legal regu-
latory framework and its self-regulatory framework in rela-
tion to advertising. In order for the two frameworks to co-
exist effectively many tasks and responsibilities can be dele-
gated to each other, if the system is mature enough. For exam-
ple, countries which have established a national tripartite
system (Boddewyn, 1992; Sinclair, 1992) whereby the adver-
tisers, agencies and media are involved in the process, the
chances of industry compliance with decisions are greatly
enhanced. In this system unacceptable advertising will not be
published or broadcast by the various arms of the media.
However, this aspect of the process was at the heart of
Australia s demise as the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) found the collusive nature of
the practice to be illegal.
Whilst many critics of advertising would argue that the adver-
tisers opt for self-regulation as a protection against govern-
ment intervention, it is this very situation that has assisted in
the evolution of the more effective ASR systems. For exam-
ple, systems such as New Zealand and the UK that do not
have the luxury of a tripartite system still achieve some
success in ensuring that when a complaint about advertising is
upheld, the advertiser complies with the ruling and removes
or amends the ad. The new Advertising Standards Board
(ASB) in Australia is facing an analogous situation as it has
been established on a voluntary basis.
Thus, whilst Australia has a new ASR system in place, the legal
regulatory framework has not changed for a number of years.
3.5 Industry Compliance
Achieving industry compliance in an ASR system is vitally
important else the process will be accused of impotence.
Compliance is usually achieved through sanctions such as
prosecution under law, in the most extreme circumstances,
and financial incentives to comply with rulings from charter
bodies. Complaint handling bodies achieve varying levels of
success in relation to encouraging industry compliance; for
example, where the ASR system incorporates a national
tripartite system (Boddewyn, 1992:9; Sinclair, 1992:3) and
Advertising Self-Regulation
Australian Advertising
Industry Council
Australian Association
of National Advertisers
Funding: 0.017%
on billings
all Complaints
Codes: ethics,
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Federation of Australia
Media Council
of Australia
Figure 2: The Old — Prior to 1997: The structure of advertising self-regulation in Australia.
Source: Harker 1998
1For example, New Zealand s Fair Trading Act 1986, the UK s
Broadcasting Act 1990, Australia s Broadcasting Services Act 1992, the
Uk s Fair Trading Act 1973 and Australia s Trade Practices Act 1974.
2Canada 1989, New Zealand 1990 and Australia 1992.
3For example the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
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the advertisers, agencies and media are involved in the
process, the chances of compliance are greatly enhanced as
the complaint handling bodies are given teeth .
4. Australian ASR
Not only is the advertising industry in Australia controlled to
some degree by law, it is also heavily self-regulated, having
observed the disciplines of self-regulation for more than sixty
years (Australian Advertising Industry Council, 1989).
However, whilst two attempts have been made to formulate
an effective complaints handling body, many of the other
industry organisations have endured and also adhere to their
own codes of conduct.
4.1 Australian Advertising Industry Council
The Australian Advertising Industry Council (AAIC) was estab-
lished in 1978 as a tripartite organisation, incorporating the
major arms of the advertising industry; the advertisers
(Australian Association of National Advertisers), the advertising
agencies (Advertising Federation of Australia ) and the media
(Media Council of Australia). The Council had three objectives:
1. to create a positive attitude to advertising among
consumers and legislators;
2. to explain the role of advertising in the free enterprise
system; and
3. to promote to consumers the benefits of advertising. 
AAIC, 1986
4.2 The Australian Association of National Advertisers
The Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA)
was formed in 1928 when 12 advertisers met in order to
discuss their common problems and ultimately resolved to
work towards a voluntary code of ethics and improved media
research. The prime objective of the AANA is to represent
and protect the interests of advertisers and its membership
includes almost all of the largest advertisers in Australia
(AANA, 1993).
4.3 The Advertising Federation of Australia (AFA)
The Advertising Federation of Australia (AFA), established in
1975, is the industry association of advertising agencies and
other advertising practitioners Its members are responsible for
the majority of national advertising expenditure in Australia
(AFA, 1993).
Prior to 1997 there were two main players in Australian ASR;
the Media Council of Australia (MCA) and the Advertising
Standards Council (ASC). The MCA was formed in 1967 as
an unincorporated voluntary association of virtually all main-
stream commercial media (MCA 1994). The MCA brought
together the various arms of media to ensure a uniform
method of extending credit to advertising agencies, and to
implement a system for the regulation of advertising content
published or broadcast by its members through development
of five codes of advertising practice (MCA, 1994). The five
codes being, the Advertising Code of Ethics, the Alcoholic
Beverages Advertising Code, the Slimming Advertising
Code, the Therapeutic Goods Advertising Code, and the
Cigarette Advertising Code.
In 1974 the ASC was established by the MCA (the media), the
AFA (the agencies), and the AANA (the advertisers) as a
strictly independent and autonomous complaint handling
body for the advertising industry (ASC, 1993).
5. The Catalyst for Change …
During 1995 and 1996 a number of significant events took
place in Australia that ultimately resulted in the industry being
charged with producing a new system of ASR. First, the
government agency and industry watchdog, the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), revoked
the MCA s accreditation system for advertising agencies
because the benefit to the public from the system was insuffi-
cient to outweigh the associated anti-competitive detriment.
This was a key event in the unfolding demise of the ASR
system in Australia, as the power of the media was crucial to
the effectiveness of the system, without its support breach
decisions determined by the ASC were unenforceable.
Advertising agencies, once accredited to the MCA for pecu-
niary and business reasons, were no longer compelled to
comply with the system of ASR. In March of 1996 the
ACCC s decision was unsuccessfully appealed and effective-
ly meant that the system of ASR in Australia had no means of
enforcing decisions — advertisers, through the advertising
agency mechanism, could not be compelled to withdraw
offending advertisements. Next, in August of the same year
the ACCC announced a review of advertising standards in
Australia, encompassing both the codes of conduct and the
complaint handling body, the ASC. Thirty days later the MCA
declared its intention to disband at the end of 1996, leaving
Australian society open to unacceptable advertising until a
new ASR system was established (Harker, 1997).
The ACCC went ahead with its review despite the capitulation of
the MCA and found that a material change of circumstance had
occurred since 1988 in regard to five key areas (ACCC, 1997):
1. Outdated Codes: lack of responsiveness of the codes to
changes in community needs;
2. Lack of Compliance: diminished powers to ensure
compliance with the codes beyond 3 February 1997;
3. Lack of Administrative Control: administration of the codes;
4. Lack of Confidence: in the membership of the Advertising
Standards Council; and
5. Lack of Commitment: of the Charter organisations, to the
codes.
Advertising Self-Regulation
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Figure 3: The New — 1997 onwards: The structure of advertising self-regulation in Australia.
Source: Developed from Baker, Graham, Harker and Harker 1998
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SECTION TWO SECTION ONE
The MCA and the ASC were the two major casualties of the
collapse of the Australian ASR system in 1996. In 1997 the
Australian government charged the Australian Association of
National Advertisers with the responsibility of establishing a
new system of ASR in Australia. The AANA launched the
replacement ASR system in August 1997 and operations
commenced at the end of that year. The AANA s system for
ASR has three important parts:
1. The AANA Advertiser Code of Ethics;
2. The ASB  a new body comprising 14 members of the
public to maintain standards of taste and decency in
advertising; and
3. The Advertising Claims Board (ACB)  a new AANA
dispute resolution process for rival advertiser complaints.
The new dual platform of ASB and ACB means that each
board is responsible for applying different sections of the new
AANA Advertiser Code of Ethics. It should be noted that,
whilst many industry bodies abide by their own codes of
ethics (i.e. the AFA4) or conduct, the focus here is on the
codes specifically administered by the ASB and, before it, the
ASC. The ASB deals with issues of taste and decency and the
service is free to complainants. The ACB handles questions of
truth, accuracy and questions of law on a user-pays basis. The
system is funded by a levy of 0.035% surcharge on gross
media billings, which is more than twice the previous levy.
6. Learning from Comparison 
Comparing both systems using the concept of collective
action , with its three purposes of realising economies of
Advertising Self-Regulation
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scale, internalising the benefits of productive actions and
changing the balance of power between participants in the
exchange process (Harris and Carman, 1984), it is apparent
that the ASC achieved more effective collective action than
the ASB now does.
Without the national tripartite system in place during the
ASC s reign, whereby advertisers were forced to remove
unacceptable ads, the ASB struggles to achieve any real sense
of collectivity amongst the industry. Economies of scale,
apparent in a national tripartite system, are not achieved with-
out the, now extinct, Media Council s input and the benefits
of productive actions are similarly stifled as there is constant
uncertainty amongst all parties in regard to the balance of
power. Certainly Gupta and Lad s (1983) suggestion that
industry self-regulation will only take place if the firms in the
industry decide to cooperate with each other, is validated here
in the case of the advertising industry in the 21st century in
Australia. Since inception in 1998, the ASB has received
prolonged and severe criticism from many commentators,
including the advertising industry, and the very uncertainty of
the compliance process has produced timidity from the
complaint handling body, evidenced by the 5% uphold rate
discussed earlier.
Prevailing community standards are usually achieved by
involving the public in the complaint handling process; this
involvement can be at two levels, as complainants and as
members of the complaint determination board. As
complainants, the public is now provided with a stand-alone
panel set up with the sole purpose of determining complaints
about taste and decency, traditionally the domain of the gener-
al public. This is a positive move. As is the fact that there are
now nearly twice as many complaints overall, compared to
the last year of the ASC s reign. More complaints means that
the public awareness message is getting through to those
concerned with unacceptable advertising.
Understanding the ASR process involves not only examining
how the systems operate but also who is involved in the
process. Both systems involve(d) the public in the complaint
adjudication process which, arguably, leads to increased
effectiveness of the program (LaBarbera, 1980; Boddewyn,
1983; Armstrong and Ozanne, 1983; Moyer and Banks, 1977;
Trade Practices Commission, 1988), and provides a credible
and transparent process which is open to all stakeholders. The
old system operated with a 10:6 ratio of public:industry
members on the Council, whilst the new system has 14 non-
industry members. 
Whereas the old ASC relied on ex-Supreme Court Judges, ex-
Deputy Prime Ministers, ex-State Premiers, Lawyers,
Doctors, sporting greats and the like, the new ASB adopts a
slightly different recruitment policy with board members
from the worlds of business, media, academe and sport.
Specifically, the ASB draws on the services of the great and
the good (Boddewyn, 1983) such as prominent business-
woman, Sara Henderson, media personalities, Mary
Kostakidis, Margaret Pomeranz and Carmel Travers, sporting
afficionados Roy Masters, John Konrads and Geoff Lawson,
author Thomas Keneally, public servants John Brown and
Wendy McCarthy, students Joanna Cohen and Kate Williams,
and others who have worked in advertising and marketing
research, such as Graham Cox and Brian Sweeney (ASB
Annual Report, 1999).
The legal regulatory framework for advertising in Australia has
changed little over the past three decades, with the Trade
Practices Act and Broadcasting Services Act being the main
pieces of legislation pertaining to this activity. The key differ-
ence between the two regimes, however, lies in the change-over
from the Trades Practices Commission to the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission as the body concerned
with monitoring the effectiveness of ASR. Whilst the ACCC
were the catalyst that brought about the demise of the MCA and
ASC in 1996, it is now closely monitoring the ASB.
In terms of the ASR framework, and in particular the complaint
handling bodies, both systems operate(d) in a similar prece-
dential manner but each has(had) a varying degree of effec-
tiveness in this regard. Both systems require(d) a complaint to
be in writing and this in itself is problematical for the illiterate,
poorly educated and inarticulate members of society who,
nevertheless, have a fundamental right to complain. Each of
the systems then filter(s) the complaints to gauge if a prima
facie case exists, or if the complaint is outside the jurisdiction
of the body. However, whilst the ASC filtered out 50% of all
complaints that were delivered to the secretariat, thus only
allowing 50% to be heard at a Council meeting, the new
administration endeavours to hear almost all of the complaints
that are received by their secretariat (Fraser, 1999).
In both systems, once determination is(was) made, a formal
written communication is(was) sent to advertisers,
complainants and the media involved. However, under the old
Advertising Self-Regulation
4The AFA s Code of Ethics was first unveiled at the beginning of 1998,
just after the collapse of the ASC and MCA. The Code has recently
been re-written and launched again (Sinclair 2001).
5NB Whilst this table is concerned with the ASR systems and codes
administered by the ASC and ASB, it should be noted that an industry-
backed Alcohol Beverages Advertising Code and Complaints
Management System was introduced in July 1998 by the liquor indus-
try (Wooldridge 1998). This ABAC is not included in discussions in
this paper as it is outside the control of the ASB, although the Bureau
does forward suitable complaints onto the administrators of that code.
Similarly, other industry bodies, such as the AFA, abide by their own
codes of ethics or conduct and, likewise, these are not discussed here
for the same reason.
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Table 2:
Towards acceptable advertising self-regulation in Australia — the old and the new
Advertising Standards Advertising Standards Advertising Complaints
Council Board Board
Representing Prevailing Community Standards
Complaint handling body — 6:10 0:14 Panel of 5 legal 
industry:non-industry members practitioners. 
Public awareness campaigns At industry discretion At industry discretion Not known yet 
Legal Regulatory Framework for Advertising   
Laws, government agencies Similar Similar Similar
ASR Framework – Complaint Handling Body   
Established 1974 1997 1998
Funding 0.017% billings 0.035% billings User pays 
Number of codes/guidelines administered 5 15 1 
Complaint procedure Written Written Written 
Number of complaints per year 1135 ( 96) 2,065 ( 99) None 
Appeals procedure Yes Yes Yes 
Dissemination of case summaries Limited — parties to Limited — parties to Not known yet
complaint complaint  
Monitor ad trends No No Not known yet 
Monitor complaints Yes Yes ASB 
Advertising Industry Compliance
Industry Compliance Compulsory Voluntary Voluntary 
National Tripartite System Yes No No
Industry complaints considered At ASC meeting By ACB Yes 
Sanctions Modification or Request for Request for
withdrawal of ad. Else: modification or modification or
loss of $ privileges withdrawal of ad. withdrawal of ad. 
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regime, this part of the process was severely curtailed due to
a lack of funds and the final situation saw only abbreviated
summations of determinations being sent to the parties, which
had a detrimental impact on precedent (Harker, 1998). The
current situation in this regard has seen little improvement,
with parties to a complaint receiving case summaries and
rulings but dissemination of this vital information is not
achieved in the wider population.
Another unfortunate feature of the old Australian system was
the influence of rival advertisers on the complaints process.
Whilst the majority of complaints made to the ASC were
made by members of the public, an increasing number came
from industry sources. When in operation, the ASC complaint
handling system visibly strained under the weight of rival
advertiser complaints; this segment accounted for less than
10% of complaints made to the Council (ASC Annual
Reports, 1984-1996), yet often represented 25% of Council
time spent in deliberation at meetings (Harker, 1996). This
situation has also been documented in other countries, such as
Canada (Boddewyn, 1992). The implications of this trend
being that the system that segregates rival advertiser
complaints, and perhaps opts for a user-pays system, will be
more effective in generating only those rival advertiser
complaints that are for serious consideration, rather than friv-
olous. Also such a system would allow appropriate time for
consideration of complaints from other sources, such as the
general public. This latter approach has been adopted by the
new administration, the ASB and, to date, the Advertising
Claims Board (for rival advertisers) has not been required to
meet (Fraser, 1999).
Compliance by the advertising industry with rulings from the
complaint handling body is a key component of any ASR
system. It was suggested earlier that, where the ASR scheme
incorporates a national tripartite system (Boddewyn, 1992,
Sinclair, 1992) and the advertisers, agencies, and media are
involved in the process, the chances of industry compliance
with rulings are greatly enhanced as the complaint handling
bodies are given teeth . When the ASC was in place, prior to
1997, the system achieved compulsory industry compliance
with this method, whereas now the ASB must rely on the
goodwill of recalcitrant advertisers to toe the line. Indeed, the
new system has had its first real test of the voluntary nature
of its compliance process and was found wanting. Outdoor
advertising for Windsor-Smith shoes, depicting a man
cradling a woman s face close to his groin (Mckenzie, 2000),
caused public outcry in early 2000 with the National Women s
Media Centre in Queensland calling on women to boycott sex
with men who wore the brand of shoe (Mckenzie, 2000). The
ASB upheld complaints about the advertisement but Windsor-
Smith refused to remove the ad (Mckenzie, 2000). Indeed, an
unintended consequence of a voluntary system of compliance,
compared to a compulsory system, would perhaps be a lower
rate of upheld complaints in the former system as the body
may shy away from confronting the industry in this regard and
this is in fact what has occurred with the new system of ASR.
The ASC regularly achieved around a 25% uphold rate (ASC
Annual Reports, 1984-1996), that is on an annual basis 25%
of all complaints received were considered to have breached
a code and were thus upheld. The ASB upheld 5% of
complaints in both 1999 and 1998 (ASB Annual Reports,
1998, 1999). However, we are not comparing like with like
here, as rival advertiser complaints are segregated in the new
system but not in the old. It has already been documented that
rival advertisers demand more time from complaint handling
bodies (Harker, 1996), however they also submit better
complaints in terms of detailing specific clauses of codes
breached and providing extensive, detailed, litigious evidence
(Harker, 2000).
7. General Conclusions
This article articulated two objectives: first, to present and
discuss the key variables associated with acceptable advertis-
ing. Second, to use these variables as a framework to analyse
the way advertising is regulated in Australia — by reflecting on
the old and the new administrations.
Given the framework used in this paper, one should be able to
now determine which systemof ASR is better, the ASC or the
ASB? However, as many researchers are fond of saying, it all
depends . In the case of effective ASR in Australia, the
perfect system would naturally have the best of both
regimes. Both systems operate(d) in very similar legal frame-
works and, without delving into the impact of the Internet on
advertising and the legal ramifications, the comparison is
complete. A particular problem for the ASC, however, was the
issue of funding and the current arrangements are a significant
improvement in this regard. However the key problem with
the new system is the voluntary nature of compliance, which
has severe implications for other areas of operations. For
example, funding is also voluntary and this inevitably puts the
regulators in the delicate situation of sometimes penalising
the very advertisers that fund their operations, and this could
affect the uphold rate of the ASB.
An extremely positive feature of the new ASR system is the
segregation of rival advertisers from the complaint determi-
nation process. Not only are there no advertisers represented
on the ASB complaint handling panel, but also they are no
longer allowed to dominate proceedings with lengthy and
technical submissions, at the expense of hearing complaints
from other sections of the community. The new rival adver-
tiser system (the Advertising Complaints Board) is operated
on a user-pays basis and it is interesting to note that this panel
has yet to be called upon to sit.
8. Recommendations for Further Research
From this analysis three key areas emerge for future
researchers to study. The first area relates to the voluntary
nature of industry compliance. Only time will tell if the ASB
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can make a virtue out of this necessity and draw on the
unwritten support of the various media bodies to assist the
self-regulatory system evolve. Regulators must, however,
learn from the Windsor-Smith example and seek (unwritten)
commitment from the stakeholders in order to ensure industry
compliance.
The second area relates to the issue of enlightened self-inter-
est and is concerned with the fact that the advertisers are, to
all intents and purposes, paying for and running the ASR
system, so how can we be sure, as a society, that they are
acting in our best interests and not their own? Or, worse still,
will our system of ASR merely have as Ducret (1991) warns,
the lunatics finally in charge of the asylum? Clearly the
numbers of complaints made to the ASB and the outcomes
reached will tell us much about the commitment of the play-
ers involved.
Finally, there is a need for future research into the representa-
tion of prevailing community standards as, generally, there
appears to be little creativity amongst the ASR systems in
operation around the world in this regard. However there is an
opportunity to learn from those bodies that do go further than
including members of the public onto the complaint handling
body and accepting. Canada, for example, monitors trends in
what people are complaining about and also the trends in
advertising itself, highlighting new developments for the
attention of its complaint handling body (Canadian
Advertising Foundation, 1991).
9. Implications for the Advertising Industry
and Regulators
Effective ASR is only as good as the demonstrated commit-
ment to the system by the players involved. The key players
of the advertisers and the regulators are currently faced with a
simple proposition: improve the effectiveness of the scheme,
else government will intervene. After more than twenty years
of operations the ASC stumbled in its approach to ASR and
the new ASB regime has been heavily criticised since incep-
tion. Current issues dogging the ASB include attacks on
outdoor advertising and the portrayal of women in advertis-
ing. If the two players allow this situation to continue,
presenting a divided front, and not uniting on these issues and
addressing community concerns, then the current system of
ASR is under threat. Unlike 1997, this time it is probable that
the government will not call on yet another industry body to
take up the reigns of ASR in Australia, and far stricter controls
will inevitably be put in place.
Enlightened self-interest can achieve positive outcomes,
provided the players are truly enlightened and committed to
an effective system of ASR that is fair and open. If such a
system of ASR is achieved in Australia then government
intervention will be staved off, however if the current criti-
cisms of advertising continue then the regulators and industry
players may be facing stricter controls. The choice is theirs.
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